Bilge alarms did not sound, fishing vessel Hotspur capsized and sank

Hotspur pierside precasualty in Ketchikan, Alaska. (Source: US Coast Guard)

In its latest report on a fishing vessel accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has determined that flooding into the lazarette, a compartment below the main deck, or port void (empty) space likely caused the 1998-built, 53-feet long fishing vessel Hotspur to lose stability, capsize and sink near Nunez Rocks, Alaska.

Hotspur began listing to port when it was transiting through Dixon Entrance near Nunez Rocks, off the southern tip of Prince of Wales Island, Alaska on August 2, 2022. As the listing increased, the captain and four crewmembers abandoned the vessel to a life raft and were rescued by good samaritan vessels. Within about 20 minutes of the crew noticing the list, the vessel capsized and sank.

The bilge alarms did not sound in the wheelhouse before the vessel list became severe. Investigators determined the alarms in the port void space or the lazarette were most likely inoperative. Had the bilge/water alarm level systems in these spaces been operable, the crew could have acted earlier to address the list.

“Automatic high-water bilge alarms are intended to provide crews with an early warning of vessel flooding,” the report said. “In inaccessible spaces, or small spaces with limited means or ability to inspect underway, bilge level-monitoring alarms are often the sole means to alert operators of space flooding. Operators should periodically test bilge high-water alarms and follow best marine practices and manufacturer recommendations for inspection and maintenance.”

With the short time between the captain first noticing a list and the vessel capsizing, investigators determined the vessel likely had limited stability while underway immediately before the flooding.

Because the Hotspur was less than 79 feet long, it was not subject to U.S. Coast Guard commercial fishing vessel stability requirements.

In 2011, the NTSB recommended that the Coast Guard “establish standards for new and
existing commercial fishing industry vessels less than 79 feet in length that address intact stability, subdivision, and watertight integrity and include periodic reassessment of the vessels’ stability and watertight integrity” (M-11-23). The Coast Guard indicated that it would not consider stability requirements for existing vessels less than 79 feet long in future rulemaking, so the recommendation was classified by the NTSB as Open—Unacceptable Response in June 2012.

Without stability calculations and stability instructions, the vessel’s operator had limited understanding of the vessel’s center of gravity. While Hotspur was functionally stable, the loading may not have provided an adequate margin of stability. The weight of the flood water, the free surface effect from the partially filled fuel tanks and the free surface created by the flooding decreased the vessel’s remaining stability, resulting in capsizing.

Hotspur was not salvaged and was declared a total loss of $1.2 million.

• Marine Investigation Report 24-03 is available HERE