GAO: Navy still accepting ships with many defects
JULY 14, 2017 — A GAO report finds that the Navy continues to accept ships with a substantial number of defects and that not all of those defects are rectified by the
JULY 14, 2017 — A GAO report finds that the Navy continues to accept ships with a substantial number of defects and that not all of those defects are rectified by the
APRIL 18, 2017 — There are those who love the Navy’s LCS (littoral combat ship) program, and those that decidedly do not. The ding dong between the LCS lovers and the LCS
MARCH 28, 2017 — The GAO has published a report reviewing the actions federal and state agencies have taken to address abandoned and distressed vessels (ADVs) in U.S. waterways. ADVs can block
NOVEMBER 22, 2016 — In 2015 the U.S. Navy introduced a new contracting strategy for ship repair, called Multiple Award Contract, Multi Order (MAC-MO). A report to Congress by the GAO finds
AUGUST 5, 2016 — A GAO study (GAO-16-613) finds that delaying procurement of DDG 51 Flight III Arleigh Burke destroyers would allow time to increase design knowledge. Flight III ships will include
AUGUST 3, 2016 — A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report (GAO-16-682) finds that, based on results of audits, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) views vessel operators to be substantially in
MARCH 4, 2016 — A GAO report says that the Navy should stop allowing shipbuilders to profit byr correcting defects for which they are responsible. The report, “NAVY AND COAST GUARD SHIPBUILDING:
The GAO report, an unclassified version of a report published in July, was released as news surfaced that Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, in a Dec. 14 memo to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, had told the Navy to reduce the planned LCS/FF shipyard procurement from 52 to 40 and to downselect to one variant by FY 2019 (see earlier story).
The GAO reiterates a number of arguments made by critics of the program. It says that the lethality and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) remain l largely unproven, six years after delivery of the lead ships.
According to GAO, LCS was designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface combatants, and the Navy has since lowered several survivability and lethality requirements and removed several design features—making the ship both less survivable in its expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. The Navy is compensating for this by redefining how it plans to operate the ships.
In 2014, the Navy conducted its first operational test of an early increment of the surface warfare mission package on a Freedom variant LCS, demonstrating that LCS could meet an interim lethality requirement. The Navy declared LCS operationally effective. However, says the GAO, the Navy’s test report stated that the ship did not meet some key requirements.
Further, the Department of Defense’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has stated that there is insufficient data to provide statistical confidence that LCS can meet its lethality requirements in future testing or operations, and further testing is needed to demonstrate both variants can meet requirements in varied threat environments.
The Navy also has not yet demonstrated that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements, and does not plan to complete survivability assessments until 2018—after more than 24 ships are either in the fleet or under construction, says GAO.
The Navy has identified unknowns related to the use of aluminum and the hull of the Independence variant, and plans to conduct testing in these areas in 2015 and 2016. However, the Navy does not plan to fully determine how the Independence variant will react to an underwater explosion.This variant also sustained some damage in a trial in rough sea conditions, but the Navy is still assessing the cause and severity of the damage and GAO has not been provided with a copy of the test results.Results from air defense and cyber security testing also indicate concerns, but specific details are classified.
Read the GAO report HERE
NOVEMBER 21, 2014 — The lead Ford-class aircraft carrier (CVN 78) looks likely to be delivered late and over budget. The Navy will try to use smoke and mirrors to minimize the
OCTOBER 1, 2014 — GAO has issued another report (GAO-14-827) on issues related to the deliveries of the first two Littoral Combat Ships. In August 2010, GAO reported that the ships were