Examination of El Faro VDR data begins
AUGUST 15, 2016 —Investigators will today start examining the data found on the voyage data recorder recovered last week from El Faro, the TOTE ship that sank during Hurricane Joaquin in October
AUGUST 15, 2016 —Investigators will today start examining the data found on the voyage data recorder recovered last week from El Faro, the TOTE ship that sank during Hurricane Joaquin in October
AUGUST 14, 2016 — The U.K. Maritime & Coastguard Agency reports that a team of eight salvors from Transocean and Smit was this morning making its way on board the drilling rig
Leading shipowners and operators, gas suppliers, ports, class societies, and technologists gathered last month in London to announce a new cross-industry initiative aimed at accelerating the adoption of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a marine fuel. The initiative hopes to address the issues of LNG bunkering infrastructure, regulatory concerns, and the higher initial capital investment costs in building LNG-fueled vessels.
Called SEA/LNG, the initiative brings together participants from Carnival Corporation & plc, DNV GL, ENGIE, ENN, GE, GTT, Lloyd’s Register, Mitsubishi Corporation, NYK Line, Port of Rotterdam, Qatargas, Shell, TOTE Inc. and Wärtsilä.
The goal of the initiative explains TOTE Inc. Executive Vice President Peter Keller, who is serving as SEA\LNG’s Chairman, is to address “market barriers and help transform the use of LNG as a marine fuel into a global reality.”
When it comes to using LNG as a marine fuel, TOTE is all in. It’s committed about $500 million in capital investments to have its entire fleet to burn LNG. The U.S.-flag operator has built two 3,100 TEU LNG-fuelled containerships now in operation between the Port of Jacksonville, FL, and San Juan, PR, and is converting the two ORCA Class Roll-on/Roll-Off ships in its fleet to burn LNG. The first of those two is being converted at Singapore’s Keppel Shipyard this fall.
TOTE is not alone in adding dual-fuel and LNG-Ready tonnage to its oceangoing fleet in the U.S. Harvey Gulf International Marine, Crowley Maritime Corp., Matson Navigation, Kinder Morgan, and SEA VISTA/SEACOR all have vessels in operation or under construction that burn or could eventually burn LNG as a marine fuel. In all, there are 29 vessels that are designed or could be converted to burn LNG as shown in the accompanying table. This does not include inland and coastal vessels such as towboats or ferries.
The U.S. Maritime Administration, for example, is supporting the conversion of a towboat to burn LNG as fuel.
The use of LNG as a marine fuel has increased with Emission Control Areas (ECAs) coming into force in Northern Europe and North America under MARPOL Annex VI. LNG is relatively clean burning, containing virtually no sulfur content and it produces lower NOx and particulate matter in the combustion process than fuel oil and marine diesel oil.
A long-time, well-known proponent of LNG as a marine fuel, John Hatley, PE, Gas Initiatives Wärtsilä North America, sees gas as a compelling solution for box feeders, RO/RO vessels, ferries and cruise ships, product tankers, Great Lakes vessels, and ATBs on short coastal voyages that enter into ECAs.
LNG is therefore able to offer a fuel solution compliant with both current and anticipated future regulations.
The larger effect from Annex VI will come when the requirement to reduce sulfur content of marine fuels to 0.5% on a global basis effective 2020 or 2025 depending on the outcome of an IMO low sulfur fuel availability study to be completed in 2018. The issue for ship owners and operators is how to find alternatives to economically meet the low sulfur fuel mandate about to be imposed by MARPOL Annex VI.
However, while LNG is a competitive fuel relative to current alternatives, LNG infrastructure is needed in ports around the world to enable quick, safe and cost effective bunkering. In the U.S., the first LNG bunker transport barge with GTT Mark III Flex tank technology is under construction at Conrad Orange shipyard in Orange, TX, and expected to be delivered in early 2017. LNG bunkering infrastructure is far more advanced in Europe.
“Everybody is calling for alternatives to reduce environmental impacts says Philip Olivier, CEO of ENGIE Global LNG. “That’s why we have joined forces to actively promote LNG as a key fuel in maritime transport. LNG has the potential to take a 10% market share of global bunker demand by 2030. ENGIE will contribute to achieving this target.”
Tom Strang, Senior Vice President, Maritime Affairs, Carnival Corporation & plc, says, “By working together proactively across the whole marine LNG value chain we can make the transition to a lower emission marine sector a reality.”
Lauran Wetemans Shell’s general manager downstream LNG agrees. “To make the transition to LNG as a fuel happen it needs close collaboration with key players across the full value chain,” says, Wetemans. “SEA/LNG aims to promote the benefits and potential of LNG fuel, and create a level playing field for LNG with other fuels. It will complement the work being done by other organizations like the Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel.”
Leo Karistios, Gas Technology Lead, Lloyd’s Register, points out, “LNG fuelled shipping has mainly been for the visionaries and, until now, concentrated in specialist ship sectors: short sea shipping and ferries, mainly sailing between two fixed ports. We want to help drive the expansion of LNG as a marine fuel of choice, with not just more short sea and local ships burning gas, but also the deep sea trades.”
Timo Koponen, Vice President, Flow & Gas Solutions, Wärtsilä Marine Solutions, says his company will contribute “its vast experience and know-how in gas driven propulsion systems and the entire gas value chain” to the initiative. “By working together, we plan to overcome the challenges and speed the general acceptance of LNG. Having been a pioneer in the use of LNG as a marine fuel, and a developer of major technologies facilitating the adoption of LNG fuel, it is natural that Wärtsilä supports wholeheartedly the aims of the SEA/LNG coalition.”
Developing bulk carrier concept
Wärtsilä is also involved with an effort with class society ABS, Arista Shipping, Deltamarin, and GTT in the Project Forward joint development project (JDP) to develop a dry bulk carrier concept that employs LNG as fuel.
The goal is to develop a Kamsarmax bulk carrier design to be the first of this type suitable for worldwide services powered by LNG in compliance with the IMO’s Energy Efficiency Design Index 2025 standards, NOx Tier III and MARPOL Annex VI SOx emission levels. This landmark design will be the first LNG-fueled cargo ship capable of full-range operations.
“The long-term potential for LNG as a marine fuel is tremendous,” says ABS Vice President of Global Gas Solutions Patrick Janssens. “We see the near-term opportunities for larger vessels on fixed and known trade routes, but more opportunities will emerge as concepts mature and bunkering infrastructure expands. Environmental stewardship will continue to be a concern, and owners will be evaluating alternative fuel choices.”
“Project Forward represents a milestone for the shipping industry in bringing to the market a practical, achievable design for what are the workhorses of the shipping fleet,” says Arista Shipping Principal Alexander P. Panagopulos. “Our mission is to develop the next generation of energy efficient and environmentally friendly dry bulk cargo ships to be sustainable worldwide beyond 2030. It marks a number of ‘firsts’ and draws together the experience of a team of leaders in their field to make LNG powered shipping a reality on the high seas.”
Technical challenges in developing this design were considerable, as there is a need to carry a large volume of LNG (2,500 m3) – which corresponds to full-range operation and 40 days – in a type of ship where available space is limited and cargo space is at a premium.
ABS will provide Approval in Principle (AIP) for the concept, which is based on the highly optimized Deltamarin B.Delta 82 design, utilizing a GTT membrane LNG fuel tank. This design also could be applied to other bulk carrier sizes and serve as the basis for an LNG-fueled tanker. The concept features a Wärtsilä four-stroke, medium-speed engine without auxiliary generators, the first time this configuration has been applied to a vessel of this type, significantly simplifying the vessel’s engine room arrangement and contributing to lower capital expenditure.
Read more from our Green Technology & Sustainable Shipping section in our Digital Edition.
Obligation, vigilance, and perseverance are among the professional qualities of the merchant mariner. Whether one attends a maritime academy, as I did, or comes up through the hawsepipe, in seagoing service mariners learn and practice the ethos of care to crew, ship, and the environment. Mariners are supposed to display those qualities in spite of cold, or rain, or discomfort–one of my strongest memories of the academy is being on lookout, freezing, wearing all my jackets. Mariners are supposed to be ready, to be watchful, to put together skills and equipment and to balance paradox and contradiction to make a successful voyage.
The New York Harbor community combined all these unique attributes on 9/11, evacuating hundreds of thousands of commuters and residents of Lower Manhattan to Staten Island, to New Jersey, and elsewhere in New York City in an improvised fleet of boats: tugs, dinner boats, tour boats, private vessels. Over the course of those hours, boats made trip after trip across the harbor. Then, as the number of evacuees from Manhattan tapered off, the boatlift shifted to transporting responders and supplies to the island, an operation that continued for several days. They accomplished the largest water evacuation in history without planning, without practice—and without accidents.
What made this possible? To find out, my coauthor Tricia Wachtendorf and I talked with boat operators and waterfront workers, piecing together their stories for our book American Dunkirk: The Waterborne Evacuation of Manhattan on 9/11. Foremost was a spirit of service and a duty to rescue that is characteristic of the maritime community. Law and tradition require a mariner to come to the aid of a person at sea in danger of being lost. On 9/11 mariners widened the compass of their obligation to include the people who were queuing up at the shoreline.
The participants in this evacuation saw themselves as part of an active maritime community. Everyone knew everyone else, they said. They knew each others’ boats, and personnel were always moving from company to company, creating a strong network of acquaintance. Even though the commercial setting could sometimes be highly competitive, there were also habits of cooperation: any company might need help from any other in an emergency. It’s almost a rule in the disaster field that the planning process is more important than the plan itself. Responders have to become familiar with each others’ capacities, resources, and limitations. The years of interaction and familiarity were actually a planning process for urban disaster management, though they didn’t know it.
Mariners lead lives of paradox. GPS provides fabulous accuracy, but the prudent mariner is still reminded to check it by other means. Some mariners have attended disciplined and hierarchical academies where they live a regimented lifestyle while also learning Bridge Team Management, to adopt proper communications skills that short-circuit the intimidation of hierarchy. They operate in a complex web of maneuvering rules, which also contain a rule that prescribes that the rules should be broken when they’re not working. Often their information is ambiguous, as with weather, so they are sensitive to margins of error. In this complex milieu, mariners are always making judgments about safety, speed, and efficiency. These judgments abounded on 9/11.
They carried passengers on boats not certified for that. In some cases, they exceeded boats’ passenger capacity. Boat operators said they didn’t do this recklessly, but looked at the boat’s performance, the distribution of additional weight, and the demands of the immediate crisis. Certainly the usual margin of safety was narrowed in this event both with respect to capacity and to navigation. In some areas around the harbor the dust was so thick that visibility was zero, but they continued on. “Radar, don’t fail me now!” recalled one captain thinking as he approached the entrance to North Cove. Sometimes, boat captains took on bystanders to assist in embarking evacuees or in handling lines. Boats used piers they were unaccustomed to, or that weren’t designed for passengers, and had to jury-rig gangways because of the different heights. The captains were careful, using their experience and judgment to know how much they could push the boundary of risk. Other rules were slackened. A Coast Guard officer authorized fueling without permits. Two harbor pilots took golf carts to move supplies. The main thing was that when they pushed the limits, they were thoughtful, weighing the risk as experience has taught them.
Sometimes older technologies are more adaptable than modern ones. A break-bulk ship can work cargo anywhere, but a container ship, not so much. Efficiency sometimes erases adaptability, but disasters remind us of the importance of older tools and technologies, such as radio. Certainly there are tools to help the modern disaster manager: satellite photography, robotics, drones. But a lot of disaster management is old-fashioned work: moving things and people, staging equipment, organizing activities, talking on the phone. Probably the exemplar of this principle during 9/11 was the John J. Harvey, a retired fireboat that had been bought and restored by a group of enthusiasts. On the morning of September 11, the group boarded the Harvey and got underway first just to see what was happening, then they moved some evacuees, but then the Harvey’s real talent became obvious: the capacity to pump a lot of water. That capacity, left over from now-ancient days of wooden piers and warehouses and stacked-up flammable cargoes, was just what was needed to charge the fire hoses now substituting for the destroyed infrastructure at Ground Zero. Even in normal times, the Harvey demonstrated the qualities of prudence and vigilance. One of her owners, a retired fireboat captain, insisted they always have some usable firehose on hand, just in case.
Of course, there were challenges. The era of deep-draft commercial maritime use of much of Lower Manhattan has long since past. The waterfront had few good locations for the boats to embark passengers and lacked critical shoreside infrastructure, such as bollards or cleats, to tie boats to. Meanwhile, the smooth stone surface of the Battery Park seawall threatened to damage boats that were coming alongside. The sailboat Ventura, for example, could not tie up there because of being buffeted against the wall. “We’re going to have a boat that’s full of matchsticks and it’s going to sink,” said the captain. Even the durable Harvey got “quite a battering.” Some boats tied up to trees to hold steady for taking on evacuees. In other instances there was too much infrastructure, some of it in the form of fences and ornamental ironwork. Several participants in the evacuation reported simply cutting down the fences to clear a path for the evacuees.
The boat operations demonstrate what we have seen in many disasters: the importance of improvised, unscripted activities, and the importance of new groups, organizations, and networks. In spite of a widespread desire to “command and control,” that is not possible in an unfolding community-wide disaster. Most people are rescued by bystanders, for example, often well before formal responders arrive, which shows that there is always a grassroots dimension to disaster management. 9/11 maritime activities took place all around New York Harbor. No one could have full “command” of these activities, where needs were being identified and handled in an organic way through a growing network. The Coast Guard took a coordinating but not a commanding role. They wisely made no effort to take over the entire operation, recognizing that they needed to let it unfold. And there would be no way to command activities that were happening at Liberty Landing, or at Weehawken, or at Highlands, a 17-mile transit from Manhattan, where they were all dealing with their own needs of sorting passengers, decontaminating people, and offering comfort and bottles of water.
The 9/11 boat operations offer some insights for urban disaster management and resilience, organizations, and communities. Key features of resilience are redundancy, substitutability, and mobility. Some vessels can operate even if others are out of service. Boats are a mobile resource, easily moved around as needed. If some facilities are damaged, others may be available or can be improvised on short notice. Some vessels of more rugged construction served as floating piers, so that other vessels of lighter design would not be damaged against the seawall. Vessels are connected by VHF radio—nearly always available– and vessel movements are organized not by a flowchart or a rigid command structure but rather by a nautical chart and the mariners’ operational knowledge of that area: its laws, regulations, and customs. Public officials in waterfront cities should look closely at the different transport modes available. In particular, emergency managers and urban planners and engineers should work much more closely together to identify needs and resources.
That’s the key. People, groups, and communities share what they know; identify what they need; and connect to others. The maritime operations on 9/11 are an example of principles that extend to other settings. In situations as diverse as U.S. wildfires to the Fukushima tsunami and nuclear plant catastrophe, people have built new networks and improvised with whatever is available. A resilient disaster response depends on deep knowledge of a place, memory, gathering resources, and finding substitutes. These are the pieces that people can assemble creatively and strategically to manage a disaster.
You can view a list of the vessels and operators that lent their support on 9/11 at www.fireboat.org/911_rescue_boats.php
James Kendra is a graduate of Massachusetts Maritime Academy and a former merchant marine officer. He is Director of the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware.
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AUGUST 9 — The voyage data recorder (VDR) from El Faro, the TOTE cargo ship that sank during Hurricane Joaquin in October 2015, was successfully recovered from the ocean floor late Monday
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