Build rate and Navy size
So, what size Navy are we building? As of this writing, the U.S. Navy has, officially, 295 ships. The American Shipbuilding Association says that by next year this will fall to 290 ships and that "based on previously enacted budgets, this country is on its way to a 250-ship Navy. Current budget practices of providing an average of six ships a year will shrink the fleet to 180."
That seems hard to reconcile with Young's proclaimed nine ship build rate–and also on proclaimed goals of reaching either a 310-ship or 375-ship Navy, depending on what you're reading.
NO CONSENSUS ON SIZE OF FUTURE NAVY
"There is no current, officially approved, consensus plan for the future size and structure of the Navy," Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, told the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in March.
In September 2001, as part of its final report on the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense (DoD) approved a plan for a Navy of about 310 battle force ships, noted O' Rourke. This plan—essentially the same as the one approved in the 1997 QDR—includes 12 aircraft carriers, 116 surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), 55 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), and 36 amphibious ships organized into 12 amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with a combined capability to lift the assault echelons of 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). It also includes additional mine warfare and support ships.
However, the 2001 QDR report cautioned that as DoD's "transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force—DoD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces."
Since that time, noted O'Rourke, DoD has launched studies on undersea warfare and forcible entry options. These studies could affect, among the other things, the required number of attack submarines and the required number and kinds of amphibious ships. "In launching these studies," says O'Rourke, "DoD thus created uncertainty about two of the principal categories of ships that define the 310-ship plan."
THE 375 SHIP NAVY
O'Rourke testified that Navy leaders since 2002 have spoken of an alternative plan for a 375-ship Navy. The primary difference between the 310-ship plan and the 375-ship plan is that the 375-ship plan includes several dozen smaller surface combatants, called Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), that are not included in the 310-ship plan.
But, although Navy leaders in speeches and testimony to Congress routinely refer to the 375-ship plan, the plan remains a Navy proposal rather than an official DoD goal, notes O'Rourke, adding that at a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on February 5, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, when asked about the 375-ship plan, explicitly declined to endorse it.
O'Rourke quotes a March 10, 2004, hearing before the Defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, at which the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) stated: "I want to say that the Secretary [of Defense] has allowed me to speak to that number [375]. It's not a number that has been sanctioned by the Department [of Defense]. It is the CNO's view."
In summary, says O'Rourke, "DoD has taken steps that raise questions about key parts of the 310-ship plan, but has also declined to endorse the Navy's 375-ship plan—or any other alternative plan for the future size and structure for the Navy."
The current uncertainty over the planned size and structure of the Navy affects the surface combatant force in particular, because surface combatants account for most of the difference between the 310- and 375-ship plans.
O'Rourke says Navy officials have provided few details in public about the composition of the 375-ship fleet, and little explanation of how they arrived at the 375-ship proposal. "This has led some observers to speculate that Navy leaders may have chosen the 375-ship figure as an arbitrary starting point that reflected a general desire to have a fleet closer to 400 ships than to 300 ships, and then filled out the 375-ship force by simply taking the 310-ship fleet and adding the number of ships (mostly LCSs) that was needed to reach 375."
Asked about the uncertainty regarding the planned size and structure of the fleet, Navy and DoD officials sometimes refer to the concept of capabilities-base planning, and argue that numbers of ships and aircraft per se are not as important as the total amount of capability represented in the fleet.
But, says O'Rourke, "DoD's recent shift to capabilities-based planning, it can be argued, does not serve as a reason to set aside permanently the question of the planned size and structure of the fleet."
Navy officials maintain that FY2005 budget includes the acquisition of nine new ships, an increase of two ships from the seven acquired under the FY2004 budget.
O'Rourke says the nine-ship total, however, includes the lead LCS, whose acquisition cost of $215.5 million is split evenly between FY2005 and FY2006, and the lead DD(X), for which the FY2005 budget provides only the first $221 million, or about 8 percent of an estimated total design and construction cost of $2.8 billion. The remaining 92% of the cost of the lead DD(X) is to be provided during the period FY2006-FY2011.
"On this basis," testified O'Rourke," it might be more accurate to say that the FY2005 budget funds the acquisition of a total of perhaps 7.58 ships—seven ships whose acquisition is fully funded, plus 50% of the relatively inexpensive lead LCS, plus 8% of the more expensive lead DD(X)."
HASC TRIMS BUDGET PROPOSALS
When the House Armed Serices Committee reported out its version of H.R. 4200, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, it recommended delays on two Navy shipbuilding programs widely viewed as transformational—the DD(X) and the LCS.
DD(X) is a multi-mission surface combatant ship tailored for land attack in support of a ground campaign and maritime dominance. DD(X) will provide the technology and engineering baseline needed to meet future maritime requirements, and for development of a family of future ships, including the future cruiser CG(X) and the Littoral Combat Ship.
The committee said it "has strongly supported the DD(X) program since its inception," but is "concerned about the maturity of the advanced technology systems that will be a part of DD(X) and beginning construction of the ship before several of these systems complete land-based testing."
The committee would like to delay beginning construction of the first ship until fiscal year 2006 and recommends a reduction of $221 million, the Administration's request for construction. The committee does, however, recommend full funding for the DD(X) research and development.
The LCS will be a new class of Navy surface combatants and the smallest member in the DD(X) family of next generation surface combatant ships. LCS will be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and tailored for specific missions such as anti-submarine, anti-surface, or mine warfare in heavily contested littoral waters, and will use interchangeable mission modules tailored for specific missions.
Although the committee has in the past fully funded the Navy's budget requests for LCS, it says it "continues to have concerns about the lack of a rigorous analysis of alternatives, the justification for the number of ships sought by the Navy, and whether the program's acquisition strategy is necessary to meet an urgent operation need. The committee is concerned about the Navy's ability to resolve the design, development, and evaluation of the mission modules before committing to the design for the LCS and beginning construction of the first ship."
The committee recommends delaying beginning construction of the first LCS until fiscal year 2006 and recommended $244.4 million ($107.7 million less than the Administration's request) to continue development of the LCS.
CUTBACK ON SUB REQUIREMENTS?
Submarine supporters are worried by what O'Rourke referred to in his testimony in March as "a study [understood] to have been done last year or early this year by N81—the assessment office of the Resources, Requirements & Assessment Division (N8) within the Office of the CNO." This study is understood to have concluded that the attack submarine force level requirement can be reduced to 37 boats if day-to-day intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions of attack submarines are set aside for force-planning purposes and the force-level requirement established solely on the basis of the number of attack submarines needed for warfighting.
"A total of 37 boats might be understood to include four converted Trident attack submarines and 33 other attack submarines. Performing ISR missions on a day-to-day basis can lead to a fairly large attack submarine force-level goal because these missions can require maintaining attack submarines on station in overseas operating areas on a continuous or frequent basis," noted O'Rourke. Potential alternative means of performing ISR missions include satellites, manned aircraft, unmanned vehicles and human intelligence.
"Reducing the attack submarine force-level goal to something like 37 boats would permit the Virginia-class submarine procurement rate to remain at one per year for many years to come, or even permit it to be reduced to something less than one per year for some number of years," said O'Rourke. "Submarine supporters are concerned that the Navy or DoD is seeking a reduction in the attack submarine force level goal to provide a rationale for maintaining Virginia-class procurement at one per year indefinitely, or for reducing it to less than one per year, so as to make additional funding available for procuring surface ships such as the DD(X) and LCS."
WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS SEEKING
According to Young, the ships in the FY 2005 budget request are "the leading edge of our Naval transformation to the Seabasing concept."
There are four pillars of "Seabasing"—Sea Shield, Sea Base, Sea Strike and ForceNet. Sea Shield is "those components that provide protection and assured access to our forces." Sea Base is "the pillar of capabilities that allows naval forces to exploit the maneuver space provided by U.S. control of the sea." Sea Strike includes "all of the capabilities within the force that provide offensive fires and maneuver in a complementary synergistic fashion." ForceNet is the network that ties these platforms together.
Sea Shield components in the FY2005 include the the final three Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Class destroyers and $166 million for systems that will add new mission capabilities and extend the combat system service life of the Ticonderoga (CG 47) Class cruisers.
The LCS is also included as part of Sea Shield and is described as "a networked, agile, mission focused, stealthy surface combatant with capabilities optimized for responsiveness to threats in the littorals. Primary missions for the ship will include littoral mine warfare, littoral surface warfare and littoral anti-submarine warfare. The LCS program awarded contracts to three industry teams in July 2003. The FY 2005 Budget request includes $352 million of RDT&E funding for LCS platform and mission system development and initial ship procurement. The LCS spiral development acquisition strategy will support construction of multiple flights of focused mission ships and mission packages with progressive capability improvements. Flight 0 is comprised of four ships, with the first ship requested for authorization in FY 2005 using RDT&E, N funds with detail design and construction commencing in FY 2005. Mission modules will deliver in support of the Flight 0 seaframe delivery in FY 2007. The industry teams submitted their proposals for final system design and detail design and construction phase in January 2004. The down select to two teams for final system design and detail design and construction of Flight 0 is reported on here.
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