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November 10, 2000 Sleipner continued No structural defects, failure of materials or other defects were found in the craft or its equipment that should prevent safe operation. Nor were weather conditions on the night of the disaster such as should prevent safe operation, On the other hand, there are no definite technical findings that give grounds for conclusions regarding the cause of the grounding. The Commission accepts that significant wave height at the scene of the disaster was about 2.3 meters. According to the Permit to Operate High-Speed Craft issued for MS Sleipner, the craft was not to operate if significant wave height exceeded one meter. Therefore MS Sleipner should not have crossed Sletta on the night of the disaster. It might seem, says the report, that the navigators lacked satisfactory procedures for assessing significant wave height. Nor did the owners have procedures to ensure that the craft operated within the applicable operational restriction of one meter significant wave height. Navigational error was the initial cause of the disaster. The navigators did not know where they were when MS Sleipner ran aground. To a large extent the navigators failed to use the available navigational aids and theestablished operational procedures. At the decisive time, immediately prior to grounding, both navigators were busy, each adjusting his own radar, which distracted their attention from navigation based on visual observations of lights and course run. The craft suffered extensive damage at the time of grounding and immediately afterwards. The bottoms of the hulls were torn up and the bow section was torn off. The craft lost its buoyancy very quickly . It took time before the captain tried to release the rafts after the grounding, He only tried to release the rafts on the port side. The Commission is unable to see any acceptable reason for not attempting to release the rafts immediately it became clear that the craft had run aground. It is not impossible, says the report, that quicker and better organized launching of the liferafts would have been of help to those on board when the craft foundered and may have been of significance for the number of survivors. No organized evacuation of the craft was arranged by the officers. Some members of the crew individually performed correct and in some cases commendable acts. However the conduct of the crew as an organized group was affected by the lack of a superior leader. To a large extent the passengers were left to their own resources. After the first message from the bridge, that the craft had run aground and that assistance was coming, the passengers were given no further information over the public address system or by other means.However the passengers conducted themselves in an admirably calm and caring manner. The Commission considers that the captain and his crew in general did not function satisfactorily, even having regard to the extreme circumstances at the time of grounding, MORE News index Marine Log Home page